Financial Integration in Autocracies: Greasing the Wheel or More to Steal? by Ramin Dadasov et al.
  
FIW, a collaboration of WIFO (www.wifo.ac.at), wiiw (www.wiiw.ac.at) and WSR (www.wsr.ac.at)  
 
FIW – Working Paper 































Financial Integration in Autocracies: 
Greasing the Wheel or More to Steal? 
 
Ramin Dadasov, Philipp Harms, Oliver Lorz* 
This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional 
quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in 
which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate  the general 
population. Although financial integration reduces capital  costs for 
entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite 
may counteract this effect by increasing the level of expropriation. Since de 
facto political power is linked to economic  resources, financial integration 
also has long-run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise 
of an entrepreneurial class. 
 
JEL classification: F21, O16, P48. 














       
    
*Address for correspondence: RWTH Aachen University, Department of Business 






                                           FIW Working Paper N° 48 
April 2010  Financial Integration in Autocracies:









This paper analyzes the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial integration on institu-
tional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an
autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate
the general population. Although ﬁnancial integration reduces capital
costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private
sector, the elite may counteract this eﬀect by increasing the level of
expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic
resources, ﬁnancial integration also has long-run consequences for the
distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.
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For more than three decades now, we have been observing substantial in-
creases in cross-border capital ﬂows. Between 1970 and 2004 the ratio of
total foreign assets and liabilities to GDP increased in the industrial coun-
tries by a factor of six, and in the emerging and developing nations by a
factor of three (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).1 Against this background,
it is not surprising that a broad literature has emerged which deals with the
impact of ﬁnancial integration on economic performance. In this respect,
several authors point out that capital mobility may not only have direct
economic eﬀects – due to a more eﬃcient international allocation of capital
– but also may bring further indirect, “collateral” beneﬁts. These indirect
channels may work through an improvement of the institutional quality and
governance in the host countries, the development of domestic ﬁnancial mar-
kets, or the maintenance of macroeconomic discipline (see Kose et al. 2006;
IMF 2007; Obstfeld 2009).
While the role of institutions in attracting international capital and de-
termining its composition is well investigated (e.g. Alfaro et al. 2008; Ju
and Wei 2007), the reverse eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on the quality of
institutions has received far less attention. Casual inspection of the evidence
suggests that one should not be too optimistic with regard to the beneﬁts of
ﬁnancial integration in this respect. Instead, the deregulation and liberaliza-
tion of ﬁnancial markets has failed to result in a desirable improvement of
the quality of institutions in many countries. According to Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), 68 out of 122 emerging and developing countries experienced
net capital inﬂows (i.e. a negative change in their net foreign asset posi-
tion) between 1996 and 2004. In 52 of these capital importing countries,
at least one indicator and in 26 cases both indicators for institutional qual-
ity, as reﬂected by the World Bank’s measures for corruption and the rule
of law (Kaufmann et al., 2008), have changed for the worse.2 Notably, a
large part of the countries with worsening institutions can be characterized
as non-democratic according to the Polity IV index.3
The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of these
observations by developing a theoretical framework which can be used to an-
alyze the impact of ﬁnancial integration on institutional quality. Considering
countries which are ruled by non-democratic regimes, we argue that ﬁnancial
1See also Chinn and Ito (2007) for similar ﬁndings.
2Table 1 in the appendix provides a list of these countries.
3The Polity IV project assigns country scores on a scale from -10 to +10 according to
their authority characteristics and adopts the following categorization of political regimes:
“autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5), and “democracies” (+6 to +10).
1integration gives the ruling elite additional incentives to implement ineﬃ-
cient expropriatory policies and therefore may result in a deterioration of
institutions. This outcome holds even though ﬁnancial integration may have
a positive impact on the de facto political power of the general population.
Our understanding of what institutions are and which factors determine
their evolution is based on ideas by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) and
Acemoglu et al. (2005), who consider the interplay between political and eco-
nomic institutions. Formally, our framework builds on Acemoglu (2006a,b),
who develops a closed economy model in which the ruling elite extracts rents
from the general population and is, at the same time, concerned with secur-
ing its political power.4 We consider a capital importing developing country
whose political system can be described as dictatorship by the elite. The rul-
ing elite decides on the “rate of expropriation”, which determines the share
of the general population’s income that is transferred to the elite. Expropri-
ation causes economic costs, in the form of an excess burden, and political
costs for the elite, which result from the general population’s ability to op-
pose expropriation. The size of these political costs can be interpreted as a
measure for the de facto political power of the general population. We start
our analysis with a static model, which treats the political power as exoge-
nous, and then extend our framework to a dynamic setting, assuming that
the income of the non-elite today inﬂuences its political power in subsequent
periods.
Using this framework, we analyze the consequences of ﬁnancial integra-
tion for both the quality of economic institutions (the rate of expropriation)
and the distribution of political power. In our model an entrepreneurial sec-
tor imports capital from the world market for given capital costs. Financial
integration – interpreted as an improved access to foreign capital – works like
a positive technology shock and raises proﬁts in the entrepreneurial sector.
In a static setting, this creates an incentive for the elite to raise the rate of
expropriation. To analyze the dynamic eﬀects of capital market integration,
we ﬁrst assume that the elite behaves myopically. Though the expropriation
rate still increases as a result of ﬁnancial integration in this case, the long-run
eﬀects are now weaker, because the political power of the general population
increases due to its higher income. As a result, the expropriation rate ini-
tially overshoots over its new long-run equilibrium level. A forward-looking
elite additionally takes into account the inﬂuence of the current income on
the future political costs of expropriation and therefore expropriates more
aggressively than a myopic elite. The expropriation eﬀect of ﬁnancial lib-
4Bourguignon and Verdier (2009) follow a related approach in analyzing the determi-
nants of state capacity in elite controlled societies.
2eralization may dominate the reduced capital costs in this case, such that
both the non-elite’s net income and its political inﬂuence may even decline
after ﬁnancial integration. Finally, we extend our model by distinguishing
the political inﬂuence of entrepreneurs from that of workers. More precisely,
we consider the case in which only entrepreneurs oﬀer political resistance
against expropriation, while the rest of the general population is politically
inactive. In such a setting, ﬁnancial integration inﬂuences political power
not only through its eﬀects on the aggregate income in the private sector but
also by changing the size of the politically active entrepreneurial class.
Our paper is related to other contributions on the institutional eﬀects of
ﬁnancial globalization. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), capital imports
may reduce income inequality between workers and capital owners, making
the rise of a democratic society more likely. Moreover, since capital as a tax
base can react more elastically, redistribution taxes are lower in an open econ-
omy. According to Bourguignon and Verdier (2005), international ﬁnancial
integration reduces the incentives for ruling capitalists to subsidize education,
which results in a decline in the political power of the poor. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2005) distinguish two types of equilibria with capital mobility: A
“good” equilibrium with capital inﬂows and productivity enhancing political
reforms, and an equilibrium in which bad institutions are in place and capital
stays away from the country.5
Furthermore, the mechanism through which ﬁnancial integration may
cause more expropriation links our model to the literature on the quality of
institutions in resource-rich economies. Comparable to the access to foreign
capital, a better endowment with natural resources creates incentives for the
ruling elite to increase the rate of expropriation (Political Resource Curse).6
In our paper, ﬁnancial integration diﬀers from the resource boom argument
insofar as the improved access to foreign capital also changes the political
costs of expropriation by directly inﬂuencing the income of the non-elite.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
the economic framework and derives comparative static results concerning
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization in a static environment. In section 3,
we introduce dynamics with a myopic elite and in section 4 with a forward-
5Albornoz et al. (2008) analyze the incentives to expropriate foreign investors in a
Heckscher-Ohlin-framework, in which foreign capital facilitates international trade. In
their model, the expropriation risk depends amongst others on sectoral factor intensities.
In Myerson (2010), the ruling government may liberalize the political regime to relax a
commitment problem with respect to expropriating foreign investors.
6Besley and Ghatak (2009) present a formal exposition of this argument. See also
Robinson et al. (2006); Bulte and Damania (2008), or rent seeking models of Lane and
Tornell (1999); Baland and Francois (2000); Mehlum et al. (2006).
3looking elite. Section 5 extends the dynamic setup to the case that distin-
guishes between the political power of the entrepreneurial and of the working
class. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a small open economy populated by two groups of individuals,
a small ruling elite and the general population. Without loss of generality,
we normalize the size of the general population to one. The elite does not
participate on the production process and earns rents by partially expropri-
ating the general population. Individuals from the general population may
work in a traditional sector (T) or become entrepreneurs, who operate their
own ﬁrms in a modern sector (M). Output of the two sectors, denoted by
Y T and Y M, can be sold on the world market for a given price of one. The




where 0 < β < 1 and L(t) represents the number of workers at time t. We
assume that revenues in the traditional sector are equally shared among all
employees. Hence, the net income of a representative worker is given by
w(t) = [1 − τ(t)]L(t)
β−1 , (2)
where τ(t) denotes the “rate of expropriation” in the economy. This variable
captures all channels through which the ruling elite infringes on the general
population’s property rights.
In each period, members of the general population choose between work-
ing in the traditional sector and becoming entrepreneurs. To start a ﬁrm, an
entrepreneur needs one unit of capital. We assume that this initial invest-
ment has to be ﬁnanced by borrowing abroad at an exogenous interest rate
R. Financial integration, interpreted as the removal of frictions that impede
capital inﬂows, is reﬂected by a reduction of the costs of capital, i.e. as an
exogenous decline of R.7
7This modeling choice is in line with textbook presentations (see e.g. Obstfeld and Ro-
goﬀ 1996, Ch. 1.3). Henry (2007) provides empirical evidence for 18 developing countries,
which shows that the cost of capital decline when countries liberalize ﬁnancial account
transactions.
4Assuming a linear production function in the modern sector, we can derive
the net income of a representative entrepreneur as
π(t) = [1 − τ(t)](α − R) , (3)
where α is an exogenous productivity parameter. Note that a reduction of the
interest rate R has the same eﬀect on proﬁts as an increase in the productivity
term α. Thus, for a given value of τ, ﬁnancial integration entails eﬃciency
gains for the entire economy. In what follows, we will use the short-hand
notation A ≡ α − R and assume A > 1.
We consider the following two-stage sequence of events: in the ﬁrst stage,
the elite decides on the rate of expropriation τ, and in the second stage,
members of the general population choose between alternative occupations
(employment in the traditional sector vs. entrepreneurship), and then pro-
duction takes place. We assume that τ cannot be changed ex post, i.e. the
elite can credibly commit to the value of τ set at the beginning of period
t. Given this assumption, we can characterize the general population’s oc-
cupational choice. In equilibrium, both activities have to yield identical net
incomes, i.e. the following condition has to be satisﬁed:
w(t) = π(t) . (4)




Our assumption that A > 1 is suﬃcient for an interior solution with
L(t) < 1. The relationship between A and the number of workers in the
traditional sector is negative, since raising A raises entrepreneurs’ proﬁts.
Hence, for a given rate of expropriation τ, ﬁnancial integration – i.e. a
decline of R – raises entrepreneurial activity and enhances capital inﬂows in
our model.
We assume that expropriating the general population is associated with
convex deadweight costs which are increasing in τ. Speciﬁcally, the income
of the ruling elite is given by
y





where we have used the fact that incomes of the general population are
identical across occupations, and where c > 0 reﬂects the severity of the
economic costs of expropriation, i.e. the economy’s vulnerability to insecure
property rights.
5Combining (2), (3) and (6), we can compute gross national income Y as
the sum of all agents’ incomes:





Obviously, GNI increases as R decreases. Moreover, raising the rate of
expropriation τ reduces Y , i.e., a deterioration of economic institutions is
harmful for the aggregate economy. In what follows, we make the parametric
assumption that completely expropriating the general population by setting
τ = 1 brings economic activity to a standstill and reduces GNI to zero:
Assumption 1 A < c/2 .
This assumption rules out the uninteresting and implausible case in which
the elite completely expropriates the private sector by setting τ = 1.
2.2 Static Equilibrium
We assume that the ruling elite dominates the political process and chooses
the rate of expropriation τ to maximize its utility. An elite member’s utility
is a linear function of the appropriated incomes of workers and entrepreneurs
less the political costs of expropriation C(τ), which are given by
C(τ) = γτ . (8)
These political costs result from the resistance of the population to expropri-
atory policies by the elite. Even in an autocratic regime citizens have ways
to oppose the ruling regime, like strikes, demonstrations etc. The parameter
γ ≥ 0 reﬂects the general population’s de facto political power, i.e. it mea-
sures the marginal political costs of expropriation for the ruling elite. Hence,
while de-jure political power rests with the elite, the rate of expropriation is
constrained by the extent of popular discontent and the general population’s
ability to express this discontent through more or less formal types of rebel-
lion. While we assume, for the time being, that γ is constant, we will later
focus on the evolution of this parameter over time and its interaction with τ.








2 − γτ . (9)







6Note that Assumption 1 implies that τ∗, deﬁned by (10), is always smaller
than one. For high values of γ, the elite could, however, set τ∗ = 0, that
is, it could choose not to expropriate at all. To exclude this outcome, which
would leave members of the elite without any income, and to have suﬃcient
scope for meaningful comparative statics, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 γ < A .
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition behind the result in (10): the horizon-
tal line at A reﬂects the elite’s marginal beneﬁt from increasing τ. The
upward-sloping line depicts the elite’s marginal costs of expropriation. This
line becomes steeper if the parameter c (determining the economic costs) in-
creases, and it has a high intercept if the parameter γ (reﬂecting the political





























Figure 1: Optimal Expropriation Rate
With (10), we can easily analyze how the rate of expropriation reacts to







< 0 . (11)
Financial integration raises entrepreneurs’ proﬁts and thus the marginal ben-
eﬁt of expropriation. As a result, the horizontal line in Figure 1 shifts upward
(as illustrated by the dashed line), and τ∗ increases.
7To compute the impact of ﬁnancial integration on GNI and entrepreneurs’
incomes, we need to take into account both direct and indirect eﬀects: On
the one hand, lowering R acts like a positive productivity shock and thereby
raises GNI. On the other hand, the increased rate of expropriation chosen by
the elite has a negative inﬂuence on π and Y . Substituting (10) into (3) and
(7) we obtain the following equations for entrepreneurs’ proﬁts and GNI
π
∗ =
(c + γ − A)A
c
and Y














A − c − γ
c
.
Both expressions are strictly negative, i.e. ﬁnancial integration – inter-
preted as a decline of R – unambiguously raises GNI and entrepreneurs’
proﬁts: while the rate of expropriation also increases, the direct “eﬃciency-
enhancing” inﬂuence of easier access to foreign capital dominates. These
insights are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In a static environment, ﬁnancial integration raises the rate
of expropriation τ. Nevertheless, both the income of the elite and the income
of the general population increase.
3 Dynamic Equilibrium with a Myopic Elite
So far we have used a static model to analyze the eﬀect of an exogenous
drop in the costs of external borrowing on the quality of institutions, i.e.
the rate of expropriation chosen by a ruling elite. In that setting, ﬁnancial
integration inﬂuenced individuals’ absolute and relative incomes, but the de
facto political power of the non-elite (represented by the parameter γ) was
unchanged.
It is likely, however, that a varying distribution of incomes also aﬀects
the distribution of power in a society. According to Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) political power is a function of material resources. If ﬁnancial inte-
gration raises the disposable income of the general population, one should
expect that this also raises its political power. To incorporate this idea into
our model, we now switch to a dynamic analysis and determine how a per-
manent reduction of R aﬀects the non-elite’s de facto political power γ and
the rate of expropriation τ∗ in the short and in the long run. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that the following process describes the evolution of γ over time:
8˙ γ(t) = ψπ(t) − δγ(t) , (13)
with ψ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. According to equation (13), de facto political
power accumulates over time, comparable to physical capital in a neoclassical
growth model. The parameter ψ determines the speed at which a higher net
income of entrepreneurs – which equals net wages in equilibrium – transforms
into increased political power, while δ is the rate of depreciation.8
Building on this dynamic equation, we ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium for
the case in which the ruling elite is myopic – i.e., its members do not take
into account that their decision on τ at a given point in time inﬂuences the
accumulation of political power in the following periods. The case of a myopic
elite may be interpreted as representing a setting in which members of the
elite live for only one period and maximize their utility in this period.
A myopic elite sets the expropriation rate in each period according to (10)
as in the static model, and (12) determines the net proﬁt of the entrepreneurs.
Recall that, due to Assumption 1, it is never optimal for the ruling elite to
choose τ = 1, i.e. the net income of the general population is always strictly
positive. In the static analysis of the previous section, Assumption 2 made
sure that the elite never sets τ∗ = 0 either. However, in the current context,
γ is an endogenous variable whose value is determined by the mechanics of
the model. As we will see, the following assumption is suﬃcient for a positive
τ at all points in time:
Assumption 3 γ(0) < A, and ψ < δ .
The following Proposition 2 summarizes the short- and long-run behavior
of γ:
Proposition 2 With a myopic elite, the political power of the non-elite and











Proof. For γ < A, the evolution of γ can be determined by substituting











8Note that we neglect the collective action problem among the general population and
that we concentrate only on material resources as the driving force of its de facto political
power.
9This diﬀerential equation is represented by the phase line in Figure 2. As-
sumptions 1 and 3 imply that this phase line is downward-sloping, implying
convergence to the steady state. The assumption γ(0) < A together with the
downward sloping phase-line guarantee that γ(t) < A for all t ≥ 0. Inserting
γSS into (10) yields τSS.
The evolution of the expropriation rate is inherently linked to the evolu-
tion of γ. Whether it increases or decreases over time depends on the initial
value of γ: If γ(0) < γSS, then the de facto political power increases over
time, and the rate of expropriation decreases. If γ(0) > γSS, the politi-
cal power of the general population decreases and the rate of expropriation
increases.
Note that abandoning Assumption 3 and allowing for ψ ≥ δ is not com-
patible with a strictly positive rate of expropriation in the long run: Accord-
ing to the law of motion for γ as given by (3), ˙ γ > 0 for all γ in [0,A] if ψ > δ.
For γ ≥ A, we have τ = 0 and the law of motion is given by ˙ γ = ψA − δγ,
which is strictly positive for γ < ψA/δ. Hence, regardless of its initial value,
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Figure 2: Evolution of γ and Steady State with a Myopic Elite
To determine how ﬁnancial integration aﬀects the general population’s
political power and the rate of expropriation in the long-run, we take the
derivative of the steady-state value from Proposition 2 with respect to R




ψ [(2A − c)(cδ − ψA) − ψA(c − A)]
(cδ − ψA)
2 . (15)
Given Assumptions (1) and (3), this expression is strictly negative. Hence,
ﬁnancial integration improves the de facto political power of the general pop-
ulation in the steady state. The dashed line in Figure 2 illustrates this eﬀect.
A drop in R shifts the ˙ γ-line to the right reducing also its slope. As a re-
sult, the new steady state γSS exceeds the previous one. Note that since
πss = δ/ψγss, ﬁnancial integration also raises the net income of the general
population.




















which is negative. Thus, the long-run rate of expropriation increases as the
interest rate falls, comparable to the static stetting of the previous section.
However, the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial integration is weakened by the increase in
the political power of the general population, which dampens expropriation
by the elite.
Interestingly, the adjustment path of τ to the new steady state after
ﬁnancial liberalization is characterized by overshooting. An increase of A
induces the elite to raise τ according to (10). In subsequent periods, however,
the general population’s incomes and de facto political power increase, which
reduces τ. In the long-run the rate of expropriation converges to a value
that is higher than in the old steady state, but lower than in the period
immediately after the onset of ﬁnancial integration.
4 A Forward-Looking Elite
The analysis in the preceding section was based on the assumption that,
when setting the rate of expropriation in period t, the ruling elite does not
take into account how this decision aﬀects the general population’s de facto
political power and the scope for expropriation in subsequent periods. If we
replace this assumption by the notion of a forward-looking elite, the elite has
now an additional motivation to expropriate the general population, namely,
to avoid a future rise in the endogenous costs of expropriation.
11With an inﬁnite time horizon and an individual discount rate of ρ > 0,






˙ γ(t) = ψA[1 − τ(t)] − δγ(t) and γ(0) given .
The present value Hamiltonian function takes the following form:
H = e




2] + λ(t)[ψA[1 − τ(t)] − δγ(t)] , (18)
where the costate variable λ(t) denotes the elite’s marginal disutility from
political resistance.
Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal time-path of τ, we
obtain the following diﬀerential equation that characterizes the evolution of
τ:




A(δ + ψ + ρ)
c
. (19)
Equations (13) and (19) constitute a system of two linear diﬀerential
equations which describe the evolution of the expropriation rate and the
non-elite’s political power in this economy. Before starting to analyze the
dynamics of the system, we ﬁrst determine the steady state levels τSS and
γSS. Setting ˙ τ = 0 and ˙ γ = 0 we obtain
Proposition 3 With a forward-looking elite, the steady state values for the
political power of the non-elite and the rate of expropriation are given by
τ
SS =
A(δ − ψ)(δ + ρ)




ψA[c(δ + ρ) − A(δ + ψ + ρ)]
cδ(δ + ρ) − ψA(2δ + ρ)
. (20)
Assumptions 1 and 3 are suﬃcient for 0 < τSS < 1 and γSS > 0. For a










Compared to a myopic elite, a forward-looking elite has an additional in-
centive to expropriate as it thereby reduces the political power of the general
population. This eﬀect is given by the second term in the above equation.
12Consequently, the long-run rate of expropriation is higher and the de facto
political power is lower than in the case of a myopic elite. This follows from
comparing (14) with (20).
To analyze the dynamic properties of the model, we rewrite (13) and (19)























Denoting by J the Jacobian matrix, we get:
det|J| = −δ(δ + ρ) +
ψA(2δ + ρ)
c
< 0 and tr(J) = ρ > 0 .
Thus, the system is saddle-path stable such that a unique adjustment path
determines the dynamics of the system. The elite chooses the value of τ(0)
to be on the saddle path, as only this path guarantees convergence to the
steady state (τSS,γSS). For any other choice of τ(0), the system’s dynamics
would either drive the expropriation rate down to zero or to one, implying a
GNI of zero. In both cases, the elite would be without any income. Since the
elite has an interest in avoiding this outcome, it rationally chooses a point
on the saddle path.
The phase diagram in Figure 3 illustrates these ﬁndings and conﬁrms our
analytical results. The corresponding zero-motion lines are given by







˙ τ = 0 : γ =






Note that the line representing ˙ γ = 0 is ﬂatter than the line representing
˙ τ = 0.
To analyze the consequences of ﬁnancial integration in this setting, we
start by deriving the impact of a decline of R on the expropriation rate and





cδ(ψ − δ)(δ + ρ)2




ψA(δ + ψ + ρ)[cδ(δ + ρ) − ψA(2δ + ρ)]
[cδ(δ + ρ) − ψA(2δ + ρ)]2
−
ψcδ(δ + ρ)[c(δ + ρ) − A(δ + ψ + ρ)]





˙ γ = 0















































Figure 3: Adjustment Path with a Forward-Looking Elite
Since ψ < δ, equation (21) implies that dτSS/dR < 0. Similar to our
previous result in the myopic case, the elite expropriates additional eﬃciency
gains caused by a reduced interest rate. Yet, the marginal inﬂuence on the
expropriation rate is now stronger, since the elite also takes into account the
potential increase in the non-elite’s political power.9 Hence, τSS increases as
R declines. By contrast, the sign of dγSS/dR is ambiguous. Depending on
the model parameters, the eﬀect of the increased expropriation can dominate
the eﬀect of the reduced capital costs such that the entrepreneurs’ net proﬁts
and thereby γ may even decrease after ﬁnancial liberalization.
In the following we demonstrate the relation between γSS and R more in
depth. For ψ → δ we can write (22) as dγSS/dR|ψ→δ = −1. Note that in this
case, τSS approaches zero, such that we only have a positive eﬀect of a decline
of R on γSS. Conversely, for ψ → 0, we get dγSS/dR|ψ→0 = ψ(2A − c)/(cδ).
This term approaches zero from below. Thus, for very high and very low
levels of ψ, a decline in R raises the political power of the general population.
If ψ takes intermediate values, however, the outcome depends on the size of
expropriation costs c and the productivity term A. If c is rather small, there
is an interval [ψ,ψ] for which the expropriation eﬀect is stronger than the
positive direct eﬀect of liberalization on private incomes and consequently,
dγSS/dR > 0. The size of this interval increases in A, such that a negative
inﬂuence of a decline in R on γss is more likely if the initial cost of capital
9This follows from comparing (16) with (21).
14R is comparatively low (or the exogenous productivity α is comparatively
high).10 These diﬀerent outcomes are illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts
the numerator of (22), denoted by F(ψ).11 For a relative low value of c, the
function F(ψ) intersects the zero line twice (solid line), generating an interval
in which F(ψ) > 0 and thereby dγss/dR > 0. By contrast, if c is relatively
high, the function F(ψ) - and thus dγss/dR - takes only negative values. We
conclude that the relation between c and A is crucial for the dependence
of γ on R. If expropriation is relatively costly (high c), the direct eﬀect
of a liberalization on individual incomes dominates the expropriation eﬀect,
and, as a result, γSS increases as R declines. However, for low expropriation
costs, the de facto political power of the general population may permanently
decline after ﬁnancial liberalization.













Figure 4: F(ψ) in Dependence on ψ
10Setting the numerator of (22) equal to zero, we obtain the following critical values of
ψ and ψ:
ψ,ψ =








Taking the derivatives of the diﬀerence ψ − ψ with respect to A and rearranging terms
shows that
∂(ψ−ψ)
∂A > 0. That is, the size of the interval increases in A.
11For this numerical exercise, we have chosen the following parameter values: ρ = 0.11,
δ = 0.9, A = 1, clow = 2.2, chigh = 2.6.
15The impact of ﬁnancial integration on the steady state levels of expropri-
ation and the non-elite’s political power can also be illustrated in a phase-
diagram. An increase in A shifts the ˙ τ = 0 and the ˙ γ = 0 lines rightwards
and also raises the slope of ˙ γ = 0. Whereas the new level of τSS deﬁnitely
exceeds the old one, the level of γSS might be lower (Figure 5) or higher
(Figure 6) than before.
We summarize the above ﬁndings as follows: With a forward-looking
elite, ﬁnancial integration leads to a higher rate of expropriation in the steady
state, whereas the non-elite’s de facto political power may rise or decline. The
diﬀerent outcomes related to the long-run behavior of γ also have implications
for the adjustment path of τ. If ﬁnancial integration reduces the non-elite’s
political power in the long run, τ increases in the course of time until a new
steady state is reached. By contrast, in the case of a positive impact of
ﬁnancial integration on γ, the rate of expropriation overshoots. As in the
case with a myopic elite, τ increases on impact as a reaction to a reduced R
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Figure 6: Financial Integration: γss Increases
In the static as well as in the dynamic setting with a myopic elite, we
have shown that, despite of a higher rate of expropriation, the non-elite’s
income and GNI increase after ﬁnancial integration. Our results concerning
the reaction of the non-elite’s political power with a forward-looking elite
suggest that the impact of ﬁnancial integration on total income is ambiguous.
Because of an increased rate of expropriation, ﬁnancial integration raises the
elite’s income. However, since γSS proportionally reacts to changes in πSS,
the general population’s income may decline. As a result, GNI may decline,
too.
5 Political Power of Entrepreneurs
In the previous sections, the political costs of expropriation were entirely
determined by the aggregate income of the general population. The com-
position of the population, consisting of workers and entrepreneurs, did not
play any role in this respect. However, there are good reasons to believe
that the group of entrepreneurs is more inﬂuential than the working class.
For example, entrepreneurs may represent a smaller group and therefore be
easier to organize politically, or an entrepreneur may acquire certain knowl-
edge and skills in her position which are also helpful for executing political
17pressure. Financial integration may then have an additional inﬂuence on the
political equilibrium by raising the size of the entrepreneurial class.
To account for this eﬀect, we modify our model in this section by con-
sidering the case in which workers are politically inactive such that only the
income of the entrepreneurs matters for the political costs of expropriation.
With this assumption, equation (13) takes the following form:
˙ γ(t) = ψπ(t)[1 − L(t)] − δγ(t) , (23)
where L(t) = A1/(β−1) according to (5). In what follows, we limit the dynamic
analysis to the case in which the elite is myopic. The results obtained for
this case enable us to discuss possible outcomes with a forward-looking elite
without explicitly deriving them. Inserting (12) into (23) and rearranging
terms yields













Again, Assumptions 1 and 3 guarantee convergence to the steady state which




ψA(c − A)(1 − L)




A[δ − ψ(1 − L)]
cδ − ψA(1 − L)
. (24)
The new steady state levels of γ and τ are similar to their counterparts in
(14). However, since we only use entrepreneurs’ income as a driving force
of political costs of expropriation, γss
n is now lower and, accordingly, τss
n is
higher than in the basic setup. The long-run impact of ﬁnancial integration
also diﬀers from our previous results. By taking the derivatives of (24) with





cδ [δ − ψ(1 − L)] + δψL(c − A)(β − 1)−1






ψ(1 − L)(2A − c)[cδ − ψA(1 − L)]
[cδ − ψA(1 − L)]
2
−
ψ(c − A)[ψA(1 − L)2 + cδL(1 − β)−1]
[cδ − ψA(1 − L)]
2 . (26)
The derivative (26) is strictly negative as in section 3. A decline in R not
only increases entrepreneurs’ net proﬁts, but also their number, such that we
have an additional positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on γ. The inﬂuence
18of ﬁnancial integration on the expropriation rate, as shown in (25), is now
ambiguous. Due to the stronger rise in the endogenous costs of expropriation,
the elite is not able to tax the population as high as before, such that τSS
n
may even fall after ﬁnancial integration.
The expansionary eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on the number of en-
trepreneurs is also valid in a situation with a forward-looking elite. The key
reason is that expropriation does not inﬂuence the occupational choice of
the general population. The elite therefore can not eliminate this eﬀect by
raising τ, and the long run rate of expropriation may decrease as result of
ﬁnancial integration.
6 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to present a theoretical framework that can be used
to analyze the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial integration on the quality of domestic
institutions. Setting up a model of a small capital-importing country with an
autocratic regime, we were able to identify two diﬀerent forces that determine
the eﬀects of liberalization: On the one hand, a better access to foreign
capital raises the income earned in the private sector and thereby gives the
ruling elite higher incentives to expropriate the general population. On the
other hand, due to its improved economic situation, the population may
become more powerful politically to oppose such an expropriation. In most
of the cases we have considered in this paper, the rate of expropriation rises
after a ﬁnancial liberalization, implying a worsening of institutional quality.
Regarding the evolution of institutional quality, we have demonstrated that
the rate of expropriation tends to overshoot as a reaction to a reduction in
capital costs. That is, the long run level of the rate of expropriation is lower
than that in the period immediately after the onset of ﬁnancial integration.
The eﬀects on the net income and therewith on the political power of the
general population depend on the time horizon of the elite. With a myopic
elite, the net income increases despite a higher rate of expropriation, whereas
in the case of a forward-looking elite, the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial liberalization is
ambiguous. If the economic costs of expropriation are relatively high or if the
general population has either a very high or a very low ability to transform its
income into political costs of expropriation, the general population beneﬁts
from a better access to foreign capital. In other cases, however, the inﬂuence
of a reduction in capital costs on the net income depends on the initial
situation: A country with high initial costs of foreign capital may beneﬁt
from a liberalization whereas the opposite may be true for a country which
is better integrated. The beneﬁts are more likely in combination with a low
19initial productivity. Since the relationship between a reduction in capital
costs and the non-elite’s income changes from positive to negative, the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial liberalization on income can be non-linear.
We have further shown that in situations in which only the group of
entrepreneurs can exert political pressure on the ruling elite, ﬁnancial inte-
gration causes an additional group size eﬀect, which raises the political costs
of expropriation. As a consequence, the equilibrium rate of expropriation
may decline due to ﬁnancial integration.
Our results are subject to some important caveats: First, by abstracting
from domestic capital supply, we were able to focus on the redistribution of in-
comes between the ruling elite and a population of workers and entrepreneurs.
With a domestic capital stock, one would have to consider capital owners as
an additional group in the society, whose members would be aﬀected by ﬁ-
nancial integration. In this case distributional conﬂicts between labor and
capital would enter the picture. Moreover, domestic savings and the accumu-
lation of ﬁnancial wealth would inﬂuence the political costs of expropriation
in the short and the long run. Second, the economic costs of expropriation
were assumed to be independent of the conditions on the capital market. A
more general approach should take into account the fact that capital mobility
also aﬀects the economic distortions caused by an expropriation tax. Third,
in our framework, the ruling elite can only expropriate domestic residents
but not foreign investors. Allowing for this possibility would add a further
channel through which ﬁnancial integration aﬀects institutional quality.
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22Country
Capital Inflows in Millions 
US $
 Change in Rule of Law
 Change in Control on 
Corruption Average Democracy Index 
2
Albania 724,71 -0,77 -0,77 5,11
Angola
R
8986,61 0,18 -0,24 -2,56
Armenia 1061,28* -0,13 0,01 2,56
Azerbaijan
R
8164,88 0,10 -0,10 -6,78
Bangladesh 4320,61 -0,17 -0,83 6,00
Belarus
D
3745,95 -0,31 -0,01 -7,00
Bolivia
R
4636,72 -0,29 0,16 8,78
Brazil
R,D
143984,31 -0,12 0,18 8,00
Burkina Faso 228,20 -0,27 0,15 -2,22
Chad
R
3351,16 -0,26 -0,17 -2,00
Chile
D
10716,34 -0,06 0,11 8,56
Colombia 8969,82 -0,15 0,28 7,00
Congo 1503,25 0,14 -0,08 -4,00
Costa Rica
D
4755,01 0,03 -0,25 10,00
Czech Republic
D
34470,82 -0,17 -0,22 10,00
Dominican Rep. 5158,20 -0,02 -0,16 8,00
Ecuador 9423,03 -0,30 0,06 7,22
Equatorial Guinea
R,D
3085,15 -0,05 -0,56 -5,00
Fiji
D 176,68* -0,27 -0,33 5,33
Guatemala 365,05 -0,09 0,47 8,00
Guinea
R
233,17 0,28 -1,28 -1,00
Haiti 808,48* -0,30 -0,39 1,86
Hungary
D
70674,58 -0,02 0,05 10,00
Israel
D
1808,63 -0,47 -0,64 9,67
Jamaica
D
2680,34 -0,24 -0,15 9,00
Kazakhstan
R,D
14882,16 -0,19 -0,22 -4,67
Kyrgystan 639,30 -0,19 -0,16 -3,00
Laos 828,43 0,65 -0,05 -7,00
Lebanon
D
16998,82 0,00 -0,32 n.a.
Macedonia 276,41 -0,08 0,59 7,00
Madagascar 263,49 0,84 -0,50 7,33
Malawi 1078,17* 0,28 -0,30 5,44
Mali 537,27 0,39 -0,14 6,11
Moldovia 897,77 -0,52 -0,74 7,44
Myanmar 3582,82 -0,31 -0,45 -7,11
Niger 569,44* 0,13 -0,51 1,44
Papua New Guinea 203,84 0.56 -0,62 4,00
Paraguay 670,99 -0,57 -0,72 7,11
Peru 3858,94 -0,05 -0,16 5,00
Phillippines 8379,03 -0,61 0,33 8,00
Poland
D
97567,40 -0,24 -0,19 9,33
Romania
D
22882,04 -0,02 -0,02 8,11
Slovenia
D
5382,56 0,00 -0,05 10,00
Sudan
R
4364,69 0,12 -0,17 -6,67
Swaziland 30,81 -1,68 -0,61 -9,00
Tanzania 450,47 -0,02 0,43 -1,44
Trinidad
D
3407,58 -0,61 -0,84 9,89
Turkey
D
86973,22 0,12 -0,18 7,11
Uganda 1136,22 -0,09 -0,20 -4,00
Uzbekistan 2715,10 -0,36 -0,09 -9,00
Vietnam 8630,09 0,12 -0,25 -7,00
Zimbabwe 727,56* -0,99 -1,12 -4,44
* Data span is available only for a shorter period of time. 
R Indicates that the country is rich in nature resources.
Capital Inflows and Change in Institutional Quality 1996-2004
1
1 Capital inflows are measured as a decline in the net external position. Data stem from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Data for Corruption and Rule of Law are taken 
from World Governance Indicators by Kaufmann et al. (2008)
2 This average democracy index is adopted from Polity IV Project. It catagorizes governments with the index level from -10 to -6 as "autocracies" from -5 to +5 as
"anocracies"  and from +6 to +10 as  "democracies".
D  Stands for upper middle income and high income countries according to the World Bank classification.  Economies are divided among income groups according to 
2007 gross national income (GNI) per capita. The groups are: low income, $935 or less; lower middle income, $936–3,705; upper middle income, $3,706–11,455; and 
high income, $11,456 or more.
Table 1